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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MATTHEW RUSHTON, : Case No. 20020154-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT MAY REVIEW RUSHTON1 S ARGUMENT THAT 
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 901 REQUIRES A 
PRELIMINARY RAMIREZ-TYPE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS. 
A. Rushtonfs Challenge to the Evidence Encompasses a Challenge to the 
Reliability Analysis Made by the Trial Court. 
Contrary to the State's contention, see State's Brief ("SB") LA., Appellant 
Matthew Rushton's ("Rushton") argument that the trial court failed in applying a 
preliminary Ramirez1-type analysis is adequately preserved for appeal since it falls under 
his general objection to the admission of the voice identification evidence under Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 901 (2001) ("Rule 901"). 
Regarding the admissibility of evidence under Rule 901, this Court in State v. 
Silva. 2000 UT App 292, 13 P.3d 604, s tated that u[o]ur task is to review the record 
evidence and determine from the totality of the circumstances whether the admission of 
the identification is consistent with the due process guarantees of article I section 7 [of 
1
 State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
the Utah Constitution]." kL at ^9 (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 
1991) (alterations original). 
Hence, any challenge to the admissibility of Rule 901 voice identification 
evidence has at its heart the concern that minimal due process requirements are met. See 
Silva, 2000 UT App 292 at J^9. Discussion of whether a Ramirez-type analysis falls 
under the general objection made by Rushton at trial because the Ramirez factors go 
directly to due process guarantees of reliability. Consequently, review of whether the 
trial court employed the proper analysis is appropriate on appeal. Indeed, affirming the 
trial court's decision without addressing the underlying reliability question would 
controvert the standard of review assigned to this issue and, ultimately, this Court's role 
to ensure that basic due process guarantees are met at the trial level. 
Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to address the issue since the 
reliability question is inherent in any decision to admit evidence pursuant to the Rules of 
Evidence. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (preservation rule 
requires that trial court have first opportunity to address challenge). Utah Rule of 
Evidence 104 specifically provides that the trial court has a duty to determine the 
admissibility of evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 104(a) ("[preliminary questions 
concerning . . . the admissibility of the evidence shall be determined by the court") 
(emphasis added). Case law further reinforces a trial court's role in making preliminary 
reliability determinations which go to the admissibility question. See e.g., Ramirez, 817 
2 
P.2d at 778. To this end, the trial court's decision ir-piy its own analysis of the 
reliability of the evidence, to the exclusion of a Ramirez-type analysis, amounts to a 
decision by the trial court that is reviewable by this Court on appeal. See, Hoi gate, 2000 
UT 74 at Ull. 
B. The Issue Is Reviewable for Plain Error. 
The State asserts that this issue is not reviewable under a plain error analysis since 
Rushton did not present a plain error argument in his opening brief. See SB 10. The 
State, however, discusses why a plain error analysis is not viable in this case. Id at n.2. 
\"» noted supra ; • fhe issue is preserved. Nonetl leless, in response to the 
State's contention, a plain error review is also appropriate in this case. See State v. 
Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, TJ41 (citation omitted). "To establish plain error, a defendant 
must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the 
hi'ii i IMIII, and (1 \ the error i1-; h!irmf"l " Id. (citation omitted). 
As discussed at length in Rushton's opening brief, Point LA, the trial courl cnerl 
in failing to apply a Ramirez-type analysis. Id. In addition, the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court. Id. This Court clearly stated in Silva that "there may be times 
when a witness's voice identification in lplicates the sai i ic coi icerns as eyewitness 
identifications." 2000 UT App 292 at ^ [18. Although the voice identification at issile iti 
Silva did not raise such concerns, this Court hypothesized that ff[s]uch a situation may 
arise when a person witnesses a crime but only hears the perpetrator's voice. If this 
3 
witness later identifies someone based solely upon his or her recollection of the 
perpetrator's voice, that defendant may be entitled to a reliability analysis akin to that 
used for eyewitness testimony." Id. atn.l. 
Rushton's case presents at least the same reliability concerns as the Silva 
hypothetical, if not more. Moreover, it is distinguishable from the voice identification 
issue in Silva, which this Court held to be undeserving of a more thorough reliability 
analysis. First, the conversation in this case is unrecorded, whereas the conversation in 
SHva was recorded on tape. R.166[12-13,29-30]; Silva, 2000 UT App 292 at f7. As 
noted in Hughes v. Mississippi, 589 So.2d 112 (Miss. 1991), voice identifications based 
on unrecorded conversations present far more reliability concerns than those based on 
recorded conversations since the latter are subject to various methods of authentication, 
such as a "voice expert, use of a spectrogram, or identification of the voice on the 
recording by someone who is clearly familiar with the defendant's voice." Id. at 115 
(holding that trial court erred in failing to let defendant test listening device used by 
officer who identified defendant's voice during unrecorded conversation). 
Second, unlike the Silva hypothetical where the identifier heard the perpetrator's 
voice first-hand, neither Officer Blackmer nor Wright was personally familiar with 
Rushton's voice or his nervous laugh such that they could make a reliable identification 
themselves. R.166[l 1,28-29]. They similarly lacked any other way of identifying the 
caller as Rushton, such as caller identification. 
4 
In fact, the only information Officers Blackmer anil \\ rk'ht had llmf the taller 
might be Rushton was based on their interviews with the co-defendant, Clayton Arnold 
("Arnold"), and the co-defendant's mother, Julie Arnold ("Mrs. Arnold"). Both Arnold 
ai id his mother told the off icers tl mt R i isl ltoi 1 was responsible for the theft of Nathan 
Christensen's ("Christensen") jeep. R. 167[44-47,79]. However, both 1 lad motiv atioi is to 
lie about Rushton's alleged involvement: Arnold was himself under investigation for the 
theft, and Mrs. Arnold wanted to protect her son from criminal prosecution. R.167[ 100, 
150,193-9? |, Consequently, the officers had only incredible, second hand information 
linking Rushton to the call 
In addition, Arnold had motive and opportunity to place the call posing as 
Rushton. Officers Blackmer and Wright gave their office numbers to Arnold and 
instructed him to have Rushton call them R 167[100,197]. Arnold could have used the 
opportunity io plan1 thr rail liimsrK'lo nu\k\ul Ihc officers and fool (hem into thinking 
that Rushton admitted involvement in the theft and deflect the focus of the investigation 
off himself. In fact, Arnold, a long-time friend of Rushton, was familiar with Rushton's 
voice and characteristic laugh enough to mimic it on the phone. R.167[79]. 
With all these concerns going i •• -;- j - •** i-:. uification 
evidence, especially in light of this Court's admonition in Silva warning of scenarios 
where a more thorough reliability analysis is required, the error in not applying a 
Ramirez-type reliability analysis should have been obvious to the trial court. See 
5 
Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 at ^41. 
Finally, this issue merits plain error review because it is harmful. IcL; see also 
State v. Jacques. 924 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah App. 1996) (applying harmless error analysis 
to erroneous admission of authentication evidence). As discussed at length in Point I.C. 
of Rushton's opening brief, the failure of the trial court to conduct a more searching 
reliability analysis resulted in the erroneous admission of unreliable voice identification 
evidence. The voice identification evidence was the only evidence of its kind admitted at 
trial. It had the capacity to sway the jury toward a guilty verdict to the extent that the 
State offered it as proof that Rushton himself called the police and admitted at least some 
criminal responsibility for the stolen jeep insofar as he was the one who switched the 
VIN plate and license plate. R.167[155]. In addition, the remainder of the evidence 
against Rushton was weak. The only other evidence presented by the State were the 
testimonies of Arnold and Mrs. Arnold, who had motives to lie to protect Arnold from 
prosecution or further investigation. R.167[44-47,79,100,150,193-97]. In addition, the 
stolen jeep and its parts were located at the Arnold residence, suggesting that Arnold was 
the culprit. R. 167[66,134-35]. Moreover, the VIN plate and license plate that were 
placed on the stolen jeep came from another jeep that was parked at Arnold's house. 
R.167[131-32]. 
Absent the identification evidence, the case against Rushton was based on tenuous 
circumstantial evidence and the jury likely would not have convicted him. See Jacques, 
6 
924 P.2d at 902-03. However, with the alleged identification of Rushton admitting at 
least partial involvement in the theft, the jury was most likely swayed to convict where it 
otherwise would have acquitted. IcL Accordingly, the erroneous admission of the 
unreliable voice identification evidence undermines the confidence in the verdict and is 
prejudicial for purposes of plain error review. See Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 at ^41; 
Jacques. 924 P.2d at 902-03. 
II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE VOICE IDENTIFICATION 
EVIDENCE WARRANT A RAMIREZ-TYPE RELIABILITY 
ANALYSIS. 
The State asserts that a Ramirez-type reliability analysis is not necessary in the 
present case because an identification never occurred. See SB Point I.B.I. The State 
makes an ambiguous distinction between an actual voice identification where a witness 
identifies a person as a caller and the circumstances of this case, where Officers 
Blackmer and Wright "testified to the content of the telephone conversation and to the 
reasons they believed that defendant was the caller." SB 11. 
The State presents no case law to support its meaningless distinction. See 
generally SB I.B.I. In fact, the voice identification is a true identification since it was 
offered to identify Rushton as the caller who admitted involvement in the theft of the 
jeep. The State had no other reason to present the evidence other than to identify 
Rushton as the culprit in its otherwise circumstantial case based on the testimony of 
witnesses who had motivations to lie. 
7 
The State similarly suggests that there is no scientific basis mandating a more 
thorough Ramirez-type reliability analysis, citing Silva. See SB Point I.B.2. The State 
also argues that the reliability concerns in the present case are not serious enough to 
require a more searching inquiry since Officers Blackmer and Wright, not victims, 
offered the voice identification testimony. See SB Point LB.3. 
The State's arguments are unavailing. Although this Court rejected the necessity 
of a Ramirez-type reliability analysis for the particular voice identification of a recorded 
conversation at issue in that case, it nonetheless recognized the potential reliability 
concerns in other voice identification contexts, as well as the need for a more searching 
reliability inquiry. See Silva, 2000 UT App 292 at ^18 n.l. For the reasons set forth in 
Rushton's opening brief Point LA, as well as supra Point LB., the voice identification 
evidence at issue here presents the sort of reliability concerns necessitating a more 
thorough reliability inquiry. 
In addition, the fact that Officers Blackmer and Wright are not victims reporting 
what they heard a defendant say during the commission of a crime is irrelevant to the 
question of the necessity of a Ramirez-type analysis. Reliability concerns underlying 
identification evidence can occur in any situation where one person identifies another, 
including when a non-victim witness provides the identification. See, e.g.. State v. 
Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, 47 P.3d 115 (applying Ramirez reliability factors to 
identification by non-victim witness who observed defendant after crime occurred). 
8 
Indeed, nothing in the Ramirez decision limits its ruling to identifications provided by 
victim witnesses. See 817 P.2d at 780. 
In the present case, as discussed in the opening brief Point LA and supra Point 
LB, reliability concerns are present in Rushton's case. The State dismisses the concerns 
because the identification is the result of an "investigator identifying] his sources." SB 
15. In so doing, the State glosses over the critical points of concern here that necessitate 
a more searching inquiry into reliability: neither Blackmer or Wright personally knew 
Rushton or were familiar with his voice or laugh, R.167[ 156,167,169,197,209]; they did 
not have caller i.d. or some other system of linking the caller's number to him, 
R.167[ 169,209]; the conversation was not recorded and therefore not subject to 
independent means of verification, R.167[ 167,169,197,209]; and Arnold had motive and 
opportunity to place the calls as an impostor to deflect the investigation and criminal 
responsibility off himself. R.167[ 100,194-95]. These factors mandate a more thorough 
reliability analysis, and the trial court erred in failing to conduct one in the face of such 
troubling reliability questions. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing and for the arguments set forth in his opening brief, 
Rushton respectfully request this Court to reverse his conviction and remand to the trial 
9 
court for a new trial.2 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this i^day of November, 2002. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
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CATHERINE E. LILLY 
2
 Rushton submits on his opening brief in response to the State's arguments that 
are not specifically addressed herein. 
10 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of November, 2002. 
